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REMOVING THE “SILENCER”: COVERAGE
AND PROTECTION OF PHYSICIAN SPEECH
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RYAN T. WEISS†
ABSTRACT
The physician–patient relationship rests on a bedrock of trust.
Without trust, patients—and for that matter, physicians—are less
willing to divulge information critical to providing accurate medical
diagnoses and treatments. The state of Florida seemingly ignored this
when its legislature, with support from the National Rifle Association
and other pro-gun advocates, enacted the Firearm Owners Privacy
Act (FOPA), a statute that restricts physicians from questioning their
patients about firearm ownership. In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of
Florida, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that FOPA did not regulate physician speech but, instead,
regulated physician conduct. As such, the law was exempted from
First Amendment scrutiny. But almost one year to the day after
publishing its first Wollschlaeger opinion, the Eleventh Circuit sua
sponte vacated its original opinion and substituted in its place a brand
new opinion—one holding that FOPA was subject to First
Amendment scrutiny, but nonetheless passed constitutional muster.
This Note uses the diverging Wollschlaeger opinions as a vehicle
to analyze the First Amendment’s coverage and protection of
physician speech. Specifically, it argues that an uninhibited line of
communication is required to protect the trust necessary for an
effective physician–patient relationship. This logical underpinning
leads to the conclusion that the First Amendment presumptively
covers physician speech and, furthermore, that physician speech
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny—a level of scrutiny that
FOPA cannot meet.
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The right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his
best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as
to need no extended discussion.
– U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice William O. Douglas,
1
Poe v. Ullman
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment serves as a shield against government
2
suppression of speech and does not cease to defend a physician3
speaker when he or she speaks in a professional capacity. In fact, the
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that professional speech in
many contexts enjoys the strongest protection the Constitution
4
provides. But this concept—protected professional speech—contrasts
sharply with the common understanding that states “have broad
power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating
5
the practice of professions.” Thus, no constitutional issue arises when
physicians’ speech rights are “implicated but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by
6
the State.” These seemingly irreconcilable concepts have led to great
confusion regarding the regulation of speech in a professional
relationship. Because this dichotomy has gone largely unaddressed by

1. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. See Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the
Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 232 (1994) (recognizing that the
First Amendment “safeguards individuals’ thought processes and expression against
government suppression”).
3. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465, 1473 (D. Colo.
1988) (identifying a “physician’s First Amendment right to disseminate necessary medical
information to patients”).
4. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995) (asserting that in certain
situations, attorney speech receives the “strongest protection our Constitution has to offer”).
The First Amendment’s protective shield is not limited to professional speech—it also extends
to speech utilized to engage in economic activity. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531
(1945) (asserting that the safeguards of the First Amendment are still applicable when the
speech involves business or economic transactions); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770–73 (1976) (stating that commercial speech
receives First Amendment protection).
5. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(citations omitted).
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7

the Supreme Court, the relationship between physician speech and
8
the First Amendment remains nascent and unclear.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this
9
doctrinal confusion. In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, the
Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of a Florida statute
that restricts healthcare practitioners and facilities from inquiring into
10
a patient’s ownership or possession of firearms and ammunition.
Specifically, Florida’s Firearm Owners Privacy Act (FOPA) prohibits
physicians from inquiring about patients’ possession of firearms and
11
ammunition, keeping records regarding patients’ possession of
12
13
14
firearms and ammunition, and harassing or discriminating against
patients on the basis of firearm and ammunition possession.
15
Plaintiffs alleged that FOPA openly discriminates based on the
16
viewpoint of physicians’ speech and thus violated the First
17
Amendment. Originally, the Eleventh Circuit held that FOPA was
not subject to any level of heightened scrutiny because it regulated
18
conduct instead of speech. But, in a surprising turn of events, the
Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its original opinion and held

7. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 834 (1999) (“[T]he Supreme
Court and lower courts have rarely addressed the First Amendment contours of a professional’s
freedom to speak to a client.”).
8. See Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 570 (4th Cir. 2013) (deciding not
to outline specific margins of the professional speech doctrine); see also Jennifer M. Keighley,
Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled
Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2368 (2013) (“The relationship between the First
Amendment and physicians’ professional speech unfortunately remains undeveloped and
unclear.”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 944 (referencing the “obscure and
controversial” relationship between the First Amendment and regulating professional physician
speech).
9. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015).
10. Id. at 869; see also FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (2014) (codifying Florida’s Firearm Owners
Privacy Act).
11. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2).
12. Id. § 790.338(1).
13. Id. § 790.338(6).
14. Id. § 790.338(5).
15. Plaintiffs included various Florida physicians and interest groups. Wollschlaeger, 797
F.3d at 868.
16. Id. at 871.
17. Plaintiffs also challenged that FOPA was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 878–83.
Although these claims may have been meritorious, they are not discussed in this Note.
18. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014).
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19

instead that FOPA regulated speech. As a result, answering a second
20
question became necessary: Did FOPA pass heightened scrutiny?
After emphasizing the state’s strong interest in regulating physician
21
speech “for the protection of the public,” the Eleventh Circuit held
22
that FOPA passed constitutional muster. This interpretation,
however, was not unanimous—Judge Charles R. Wilson penned a
fiery dissent, claiming that FOPA “significantly infringes upon [the
23
First Amendment] right . . . and cannot pass constitutional muster.”
This Note uses the Wollschlaeger decision as a lens through
which to examine the coverage and protection of physician speech
under the First Amendment. It argues that physician speech
presumptively falls within the First Amendment’s boundaries because
an uninhibited line of communication is necessary to a physician–
patient relationship founded on trust. Furthermore, as restricting
physician speech on discrete topics is necessarily content based, these
regulatory schemes must receive at least intermediate scrutiny.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I sets the stage by
providing a brief history of FOPA, the First Amendment, and
governmental regulation of physicians. Part II argues that physician
speech is “covered” by the First Amendment and that the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision to analyze FOPA under heightened scrutiny was
correct—but for the wrong reasons. Having shown that the First
Amendment cannot be avoided, Part III explains why and when
regulations that restrict physician speech should be subjected to
intermediate scrutiny. In doing so, Part III posits that FOPA violates
the First Amendment.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
Grasping the concept of physician speech through the lens of
Wollschlaeger requires reviewing certain background principles. Part
A chronicles both FOPA’s infancy and the Wollschlaeger case. Part B
expatiates on freedom of speech and provides a broad overview of
19. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 886. During final revisions to this Note, the Eleventh
Circuit sua sponte vacated and replaced its July 2015 opinion as well. Wollschlaeger v. Governor
of Fla., No. 12-14009, 2015 WL 8639875 (11th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015). Due to publication deadlines,
this Note does not take that opinion into account.
20. See Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 886 (proceeding to the scrutiny question only after
holding that FOPA implicates speech).
21. Id. at 889.
22. Id. at 900.
23. Id. at 902 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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the First Amendment. Finally, Part C describes the government’s
ability to regulate the medical field.
A. FOPA’s Impetus and Infancy
1. “A miffed mother, a perturbed pediatrician, a fervent gun-rights
24
organization, and a responsive lawmaker . . . .” In July 2010, Amber
Ullman, a twenty-six-year-old mother from Summerfield, Florida,
took her four-month-old daughter to the family’s pediatrician, Dr.
25
Chris Okonkwo. Dr. Okonkwo, “a board-certified pediatrician
26
specializing in comprehensive pediatric care,” began asking Mrs.
27
Ullman a variety of questions. Included among those questions was
28
one that pediatricians commonly ask, and the American Association
29
of Pediatrics explicitly recommends: Were firearms kept in the
30
Ullman household?
Surprised and insulted, Mrs. Ullman refused to answer Dr.
31
Okonkwo’s question. Mrs. Ullman did not grasp why Dr.
Okonkwo’s inquiry into firearm possession, which she regarded as
privacy invasive, was necessary or relevant to her child’s medical care

24. Clay Calvert, Daniel Axelrod, Justin B. Hayes & Minch Minchin, Physicians, Firearms
& Free Expression: Reconciling First Amendment Theory with Doctrinal Analysis Regarding the
Right to Pose Questions to Patients, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
25. Melinda Carstensen, Scott Signs Doctor-Gun Measure, THE GAINESVILLE SUN (June
3, 2011), http://www.gainesville.com/article/20110603/ARTICLES/110609797 [http://perma.cc/
H8AM-Q36K].
26. Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 11.
27. Fred Hiers, Family and Pediatrician Tangle Over Gun Question, OCALA STARBANNER (July 24, 2010), http://www.ocala.com/article/20100724/ARTICLES/7241001 [http://
perma.cc/H8S4-X2YT].
28. See Gayland O. Hethcoat II, In the Crosshairs: Legislative Restrictions on PatientPhysician Speech About Firearms, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 5 (2012) (classifying Dr.
Okonkwo’s question regarding firearms in the home as a “typical query”).
29. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Firearm-Related Injuries
Affecting the Pediatric Population, 130 PEDIATRICS 1416, 1421 (2012) (“The AAP recommends
that pediatricians incorporate questions about the presence and availability of firearms into
their patient history taking and urge parents who possess guns to prevent access to these guns by
children.”); see also AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 138 (2015), http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/Hlth-Ethics.pdf [http://perma.
cc/NBM6-NGDW] (recommending that physicians “inquire as to the presence of household
firearms as a part of childproofing the home” to help prevent accidental firearm deaths in
children).
30. Stacey Singer, Pediatricians Say Gun Privacy Bill Would Muzzle Them, PALM BEACH
POST (Apr. 23, 2011, 1:59 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/state-regional/
pediatricians-say-gun-privacy-bill-would-muzzle-th/nLrqP [http://perma.cc/Y7V2-4QVV].
31. See Hiers, supra note 27 (classifying Mrs. Ullman’s deflective actions as “defensive”).
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32

or safety. Dr. Okonkwo, on the other hand, believed that the
question was critical to his ability to provide full and complete
33
medical care. To him, the inquiry was analogous to “ask[ing] parents
whether they have pools at their homes so he can advise them about
34
water safety.” Dr. Okonkwo attempted to assuage Mrs. Ullman’s
concerns by explaining his rationale for asking these introductory
35
questions, but his attempt was futile. Mrs. Ullman refused to answer,
responding, “Didn’t you hear what I said? None of your damn
36
business!” Dr. Okonkwo clarified for Mrs. Ullman that her refusal to
answer the question “demonstrated a lack of trust—the cornerstone
37
of the patient–physician relationship.” Consequently, Dr. Okonkwo
terminated the physician–patient relationship and informed Mrs.
38
Ullman that she had thirty days to find a new pediatrician.
This episode in Summerfield however, was not an isolated
occurrence. Throughout Florida, constituents reported to their
lawmakers that physicians were inquiring into their private possession
of firearms. One legislator, for example, expressed concern after a
constituent informed him that “a doctor had refused care upon a nine
year old . . . because they wanted to know if they had a firearm in
39
their home.” Another state legislator faced this situation personally
when asked about gun ownership during a visit with his daughter to
40
the family’s pediatrician. After the pediatrician asked that he
remove any firearms from his family’s home, the legislator felt that
41
his Second Amendment rights were under attack.
These narratives served as a springboard for a newly elected
42
state representative to propose House Bill 155 in January 2011. As

32. See Singer, supra note 30 (stating that Mrs. Ullman explained that whether she owns a
gun “has nothing to do with the health of [her] child”).
33. Hiers, supra note 27.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Helena Rho, The Pediatricians vs. the NRA, SLATE (Feb. 1, 2013, 2:53 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2013/02/pediatricians_and_
nra_physician_gag_rules_and_the_cdc_aca_and_states.html [http://perma.cc/64B5-JYPY].
37. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 6.
38. Id. at 6–7.
39. Brief for Appellants at 3, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir.
2014) (No. 1:11-cv-22026-MGC), http://op.bna.com/hl.nsf/id/mapi92vmu9/$File/woll%20state's
%20brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/8Q6A-LDYW].
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id.
42. Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 13.
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introduced, House Bill 155 proffered that verbal or written inquiries
“concerning the ownership of a firearm by a patient or the family of a
patient” by physicians or their staff “violate[] the privacy of the
43
patient or the patient’s family members, respectively.” Additionally,
the original version contained draconian punishments—violating the
statute was a third-degree felony and exposed physicians to fines of
44
up to $5 million dollars. After four months and several
45
46
amendments, FOPA was codified in its current form.
47
FOPA imposes on healthcare practitioners four obligations
relevant to the discussion here. First, the inquiry provision mandates
that healthcare practitioners may not “mak[e] a written inquiry or
ask[] questions concerning the ownership of a firearm or ammunition
48
by the patient or by a family member of that patient,” unless that
49
practitioner believes, in good faith, that the information is relevant.
Second, unless relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety,
healthcare practitioners “may not intentionally enter any disclosed
information concerning firearm ownership into the patient’s medical
50
record.” As with the inquiry provision, however, physicians may
51
keep records regarding firearm ownership if deemed relevant. Third,
the harassment provision directs healthcare practitioners not to
harass patients regarding firearm ownership or possession during an
52
examination. Fourth, the discrimination provision provides that
healthcare practitioners must “not discriminate against a patient
based solely upon the patient’s exercise of the constitutional right to

43. H.B. 155, 113th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011).
44. Id. As codified, FOPA significantly reduced the disciplinary measures. See FLA. STAT.
§ 456.072(2) (2014) (codifying the disciplinary actions).
45. Compare H.B. 155, 113th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011) (prohibiting “inquiries by
physicians or other medical personnel concerning the [patient’s or family member’s] ownership
of a firearm”), with FLA. STAT. § 790.388 (adding, inter alia, provisions addressing inquiries
made in good faith that the information is relevant, inquiries by emergency medical
professionals, and insurers’ use of information relating to firearm ownership).
46. See FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (codifying FOPA).
47. See FLA. STAT. § 456.001(4) (defining “[h]ealth care practitioner” as an individual
licensed to give medical care under the Florida Statutes, including physicians).
48. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2); see also FLA. STAT. § 381.026(4)(b)(8) (codifying this
provision in the Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities).
49. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2).
50. Id. § 790.338(1).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 790.338(6); see also id. § 381.026(4)(b)(11) (codifying this provision in the Florida
Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities).
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53

own and possess firearms or ammunition.” Violating any of these
provisions exposes the physician to a wide variety of punishments,
54
including fines, reduction of practice, return of fees, probation, and
55
revocation or suspension of the physician’s medical license.
2. The Wollschlaeger Case and Subsequent Litigation. FOPA
56
incited significant debate and condemnation. Supporters of the
57
statute, including the National Rifle Association (NRA), argued that
firearm possession is a private matter and is protected as a
58
fundamental right by the Second Amendment. Additionally,
supporters perceived the firearm inquiries as an expression of an
59
“anti-gun political agenda,” not medical advice. FOPA’s opponents,
on the other hand, claimed that instead of protecting privacy, FOPA
intrudes upon the trust necessary to the patient–physician
60
relationship. Furthermore, opponents countered, firearms do, in
61
fact, present significant medical health risks. Thus, doctors ask these
53. Id. § 790.338(5); see also id. § 380.026(4)(b)(10) (codifying this provision in the Florida
Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities).
54. Reduction of practice encompasses a wide variety of restrictions, including limitations
on the following: the setting a physician can practice in, the type of services a physician can
provide, the number of hours a physician can work, or “any other restriction found to be
necessary for the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare.” Id. § 456.072(2)(c).
55. See id. § 456.072(2) (codifying the disciplinary actions).
56. See Jay Weaver, Miami Federal Judge Sides With ‘Docs’ Over ‘Glocks’ in Fla. Gun
Rights Case, MIAMI HERALD (July 2, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politicsgovernment/article1940987.html [http://perma.cc/N37N-NBDY] (classifying the ensuing debate
as “an ideological battle between advocates of free speech and the right to bear arms”).
57. See Frank Cerabino, Opinion, Talk to Me, Doc; Just Don’t Ask About My Guns, PALM
BEACH POST (Feb. 24, 2011, 1:43 PM), http://m.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/cerabino-talkto-me-doc-just-dont-ask-about-my-gun/nLqL5 [http://perma.cc/5BRQ-3HRE] (claiming that the
NRA lobbied the Florida Legislature “to criminalize the practice of responsible patient care”).
58. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 8. Florida Governor Rick Scott, for example, supported
FOPA as a defender of Second Amendment rights. See Fla. Lawsuit: Can Doctors Ask Patients
About Guns?, FOX NEWS (July 13, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/07/13/fla-lawsuit-candoctors-ask-patients-about-guns [http://perma.cc/M3ZQ-G63Y] (“I believe in the Second
Amendment. I believe the citizens have a right to bear arms.”). Ironically, Governor Scott
seemingly overlooked FOPA’s First Amendment implications. See id. (explaining Governor
Scott’s assertion that citizens “should be able to lead . . . lives without people intruding on
them”).
59. Greg Allen, Florida Bill Could Muzzle Doctors on Gun Safety, NPR (May 7, 2011, 7:31
AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/07/136063523/florida-bill-could-muzzle-doctors-on-gun-safety
[http://perma.cc/T7W4-8KJM].
60. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 9.
61. Kathleen Haughney, State Appeals ‘Docs v. Glocks’ Ruling, SUN-SENTINEL (July 31,
2012), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-07-31/news/fl-state-appeals-docs-glocks-ruling-20120
731_1_glocks-state-appeals-state-associations [http://perma.cc/Z8F5-MBJ2].
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questions not to further their own political agenda, but rather to
62
convey medical advice that helps prevent accidental injuries. Finally,
opponents claimed that any politicizing of FOPA was a result of the
63
NRA’s lobbying efforts.
Four days after FOPA was passed, a group of physicians and
physician interest groups filed suit in the Southern District of Florida
64
against various State officials, alleging that FOPA violates the First
65
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. As
a threshold matter, the Southern District of Florida rejected the
State’s argument that FOPA dodged First Amendment scrutiny as a
66
regulation of conduct, not speech. Had the Southern District
classified FOPA as a regulation of conduct, FOPA would “not [be]
67
subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all.” And while the court did
not explicitly decide what level of scrutiny to apply, the court
68
undoubtedly applied some level of heightened scrutiny. Any
decisional avoidance as to the appropriate level of scrutiny was solely
69
because FOPA failed under either intermediate or strict scrutiny.
Consequently, the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of
70
FOPA.

62. See Allen, supra note 59 (diffusing opponents’ fears by explaining that asking
preliminary questions is a form of “anticipatory guidance”).
63. See, e.g., Steve Bousquet, Guns and Florida: A Brief History, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan.
7, 2013, 5:39 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/guns-and-florida-abrief-historybr-br-/1269376 [http://perma.cc/MA66-L2A5] (identifying Marion Hammer as the
Florida lobbyist for the NRA); Fredereka Schouten, Little-Known Laws Shed Light on NRA
Influence, USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2013, 10:36 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2013/01/15/nra-gun-friendly-laws/1833733 [http://perma.cc/MZK8-UGX8] (noting that
“a Florida gun rights lobbyist and former NRA president” supported the law through the
Florida legislature); Tom Watkins, How the NRA Wields Its Influence, CNN (Jan. 10, 2013,
7:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/09/us/nra-gun-research [http://perma.cc/HB5F-WRDB]
(“Gun-rights advocates, including the NRA, have raised concerns about tracking [firearm
ownership] data, including the possibility that acknowledging legal gun ownership could bring
higher insurance premiums.”).
64. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1262 (referencing the court’s preliminary injunction, in which the court
determined that FOPA “did not constitute a permissible regulation of professional speech or
occupational conduct that imposed a mere incidental burden on speech”).
67. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
68. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
69. See id. (uncovering no reason to decide which standard applies); see also Calvert et al.,
supra note 24, at 31–35 (summarizing both the intermediate and strict scrutiny analyses
conducted by the district court).
70. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
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The defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. After the
72
majority hurdled procedural obstacles, it held that FOPA regulated
73
“professional conduct,” not speech. Thus, FOPA did not burden
74
speech protected by the First Amendment. Because the First
Amendment was not triggered, FOPA was not subject to any level of
75
heightened constitutional scrutiny. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision and vacated the injunction
76
against FOPA’s enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision,
however, was not unanimous. Judge Wilson authored a lengthy
dissent, which claimed that the majority’s opinion was
77
“unprecedented.” According to Judge Wilson, “physician[s] must
know all that a patient can articulate” to give a full diagnosis and
78
treatment, and limiting that discussion does not “prevent irrelevant
79
speech from harming the doctor-patient relationship.” It only
80
“make[s] healthcare worse.”
Almost one year to the day after the original Wollschlaeger
81
opinion was published, the Eleventh Circuit, shockingly, sua sponte
82
substituted the original opinion with a revised opinion. Instead of
holding that FOPA fell wholly outside the scope of First Amendment
coverage as a regulation of conduct, as it did initially, in the revised
opinion the court concluded that “the record-keeping, inquiry, and
harassment provisions do regulate a significant amount of protected

71. Notice of Appeal at 1, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir.
2014) (No. 12-14009).
72. See Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1209–13 (concluding that the plaintiffs have standing,
and that their claims are ripe).
73. Id. at 1217.
74. See id. (construing FOPA as having merely “an incidental effect on physicians’
speech”).
75. See id. at 1225 n.17 (reasoning that because FOPA regulates conduct and not speech,
“the First Amendment generally does not provide the physician with a shield”); see also id. at
1219 (rationalizing that when a law does not burden a substantial amount of protected speech
“it does not implicate constitutionally protected activity under the First Amendment” (quoting
Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2011))).
76. Id. at 1203.
77. Id. at 1231 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1237 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
79. Id. at 1270–71.
80. Id. at 1271.
81. The original opinion was published on July 25, 2014, id., while the revised opinion was
published on July 28, 2015. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 859 (11th Cir.
2015).
82. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 868.
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83

speech.” As a result, the majority had two supplemental issues to
decide: (1) the “level of scrutiny the First Amendment demands of
84
these provisions,” and (2) whether FOPA passed constitutional
85
muster under the applicable level of scrutiny. After establishing that
86
FOPA was subject to intermediate scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit
held that FOPA survived constitutional scrutiny “as a permissible
87
restriction of professional speech.”
Although Judge Wilson applauded the majority for finally
“subject[ing] [FOPA] to First Amendment scrutiny,” he again
88
dissented. Per Judge Wilson’s reading, rather than definitively
holding that intermediate scrutiny applied to physician speech, the
majority left “open the possibility of a more deferential approach to
restrictions of speech within the boundaries of a professional
89
relationship.” But even assuming for the sake of argument that
intermediate scrutiny applied, Judge Wilson argued that FOPA not
only “cause[s] doctors to know less, not more, about their patients’
90
91
firearm ownership status,” but also fails to protect patients’ privacy
92
or their Second Amendment rights. In fact, per Judge Wilson’s
reading, protecting firearm owners from uneasy “questioning or
counseling on firearm safety does not implicate Second Amendment
93
concerns.” Thus, he would have held that FOPA is an
94
unconstitutional restriction on physicians’ First Amendment rights.

83. Id. at 886. To be sure, the majority opinion concluded that FOPA’s discrimination
provision “is a regulation of professional conduct with merely an incidental effect on speech,
and thus does not implicate the First Amendment.” Id.
84. Id. (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 230 (1985) (White, J., concurring)).
85. See id. at 896 (proceeding to consider whether FOPA passes the requisite level of
scrutiny).
86. Id. (“Accordingly, we will proceed under the rubric of intermediate scrutiny.”).
87. Id. at 900.
88. Id. at 901 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 909.
90. Id. at 923.
91. See id. at 925 (“[FOPA] plainly is more extensive than necessary to serve patients’
interest in keeping the information from their doctors and fails under . . . intermediate
scrutiny.”).
92. See id. at 927 (acknowledging that Florida’s asserted Second Amendment interest
“belies the State’s desire simply to silence a message with which it disagrees”).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 909 (asserting that FOPA “is unconstitutional under either” strict or intermediate
scrutiny).
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B. A Brief Overview of the First Amendment
The First Amendment, which has been construed to guarantee
95
speech and association rights, mandates that “Congress shall make
96
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” But freedom of speech
97
is not an absolute right. Rather, the First Amendment provides
tiered levels of protection, which are determined by “the nature of
the speech or association, the nature of the regulation, and the
98
location where it occurs.” Thus, while certain types of speech receive
99
the strongest protection the Constitution has to offer, others receive
100
no protection at all.
There are two primary categories of restrictions on speech:
101
content-based and content-neutral. When a regulation restricts
102
speech because of its “subject matter[] or its content,” it is generally
103
Because the First
considered a content-based restriction.
Amendment commands that the “government has no power to
104
restrict expression because of its message [or] its ideas,” these
content-based restrictions are “presumptively invalid” and subject to
105
strict scrutiny. On the other hand, a regulation that applies to all
speech regardless of content is generally considered content95. See Cty. Sec. Agency v. Ohio Dep’t of Commerce, 296 F.3d 477, 486 (6th Cir. 2002)
(referencing the “strong protection” afforded by the First Amendment); Robert A. Sedler, An
Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 377, 379 (“The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of speech very expansively, and the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of
speech is perhaps the strongest protection afforded to any individual right under the
Constitution.”).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
97. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 961
(4th ed. 2011) (acknowledging that “there are some categories of speech that are unprotected or
less protected by the First Amendment”).
98. Kelly P. Welch, Note, Graffiti and the Constitution: A First Amendment Analysis of the
Los Angeles Tagging Crew Injunction, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 214 (2011).
99. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (recognizing that content-based restrictions
on political speech in a public forum are “subjected to the most exacting scrutiny”).
100. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (noting that “‘fighting’
words” receive no First Amendment Protection).
101. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 58 (1987)
(referencing both content-based and content-neutral regulations).
102. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).
103. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 960 (“The Supreme Court frequently has declared
that the very core of the First Amendment is that the government cannot regulate speech based
on its content.”).
104. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
105. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
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106

neutral. These types of restrictions are less objectionable because
they do not single out specific content. Accordingly, they receive only
107
intermediate scrutiny.
Content-based and content-neutral regulations are not the only
speech restrictions addressed by the First Amendment. For instance,
certain types of speech receive a lower species of constitutional
108
109
protection.
This category includes commercial speech,
110
111
professional speech, and low value sexual speech. Furthermore,
some speech falls completely outside of the First Amendment’s
112
coverage and fails to trigger any Constitutional protection. Any
restrictions on these types of speech are thus upheld as
constitutionally permissible.
C. Regulating Healthcare Under the State’s Police Power
The most common use of the states’ police power to restrict
113
114
physician speech is through licensure. As early as 1889, the
Supreme Court recognized that the government may limit physician
speech to only those citizens that possess a license. In Dent v. West
115
116
Virginia, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
regulation that required physicians to possess a “certificate from the
106. See Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984) (explaining the content-neutrality of the law at issue). These regulations must be both
viewpoint neutral and subject-matter neutral. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 961.
107. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
108. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) (noting that the
First Amendment applies different levels of protection to certain types of speech).
109. For a discussion of the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech, see infra
notes 262–66 and accompanying text.
110. For an argument that professional speech deserves intermediate scrutiny, see infra Part
III.A.
111. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a restriction on nonobscene sexual speech).
112. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (explaining that the
“lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words” do not enjoy
the First Amendment’s coverage).
113. See Shawn L. Fultz, Comment, If It Quacks Like a Duck: Reviewing Health Care
Providers’ Speech Restrictions Under the First Prong of Central Hudson, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 567,
571 (2013) (noting that states often use their police power to regulate professions through the
issuance of licenses).
114. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (recognizing the state’s inherent
licensing ability).
115. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
116. The constitutional claim in Dent was a due-process claim. Id. at 121.
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117

State Board of Health” to practice medicine. The Supreme Court
affirmed that “[t]he power of the State to provide for the general
welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as,
in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the
118
consequences of ignorance and incapacity.” The Court emphasized
119
the importance of this power as applied to the medical field.
Because the regulation promoted proficiency in the practice of
medicine, the license requirement was upheld as a proper use of West
120
Virginia’s police powers.
121
In Watson v. Maryland, the Supreme Court again recognized
the states’ legitimate interest in restricting physician speech through
regulating the medical field. Maryland, pursuant to its police powers,
made it a crime to practice medicine without applying for and
122
obtaining a license. The licensure requirement was predicated on
the fact that “[d]ealing . . . with the lives and health of the people”
123
requires a particular level of skill and education. Those that lacked
the requisite skill and education were unable to speak as physicians.
Since licensure regulations are “within the legislative capacity of the
124
State in the exercise of its police power,” the regulation was held
125
constitutionally permissible.
Moreover, the states’ authority to restrict speech through
licensure is not limited in scope; it encompasses a wide swath of
healthcare professions. For instance, in Williamson v. Lee Optical of
126
Oklahoma Inc., the Supreme Court considered a statute that
restricted opticians from fitting eyeglasses without a prescription to

117. Id. at 115.
118. Id. at 122.
119. See id. (“Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it
than that of medicine.”).
120. Id. at 128.
121. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910).
122. Id. at 174. As in Dent, the primary constitutional claim was a due-process claim. Id. at
175.
123. Id. at 176. By the time of the Watson decision, it was well recognized and widely
accepted that states possessed the ability to execute licensure requirements. See id. (“To this
end many of the States of the Union have enacted statutes which require the practitioner of
medicine to submit to an examination . . . and to receive duly authenticated certificates showing
that they are deemed to possess the necessary qualifications of learning, skill and character
essential to their calling.”).
124. Id. at 178.
125. Id. at 180.
126. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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Because the
do so from an ophthalmologist or optometrist.
128
opticians engaged in medical practices, they could be subject to
129
professional regulations—notably, the licensure restriction.
Similarly, in National Association for the Advancement of
130
Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychology, the Ninth Circuit
addressed the constitutionality of a licensure requirement for
131
psychoanalysts. Since the court recognized that California could
132
regulate the licensing of a physician,
the regulation on
133
psychoanalysts was properly upheld.
Beyond simple licensure requirements, states commonly
implement other restrictions via their police power to protect “the
134
welfare and safety of society.” One such regulatory avenue restricts
specified conduct within the medical profession. In Semler v. Oregon
135
State Board of Dental Examiners, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of a statute that sanctioned dentists from advertising
136
their professional services. At the outset, the Court tersely affirmed
137
that “the protective power of the State” conclusively encompasses
138
the ability to regulate the dental profession. Because the advertising
restriction fell within the State’s police powers, the sanctions against
139
dentist advertising were upheld as permissible.

127. Id. at 485 n.1.
128. Williamson implies that anything pertaining to the body’s health is considered medical
care. See id. at 490 (explaining that opticians “enter the field of health” because eyeglass frames,
coupled with corrective lenses, pertain to the human eye).
129. See id. at 491 (upholding the license requirement on fitting eyeglasses).
130. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d
1043 (9th Cir. 2000).
131. Id. at 1047.
132. See id. at 1050 (“[M]ost federal courts have held that a patient does not have a
constitutional right to obtain a particular type of treatment or to obtain the treatment from a
particular provider if the government has reasonably prohibited that type of treatment or
provider.” (quoting Mitchell v. Clayton, 955 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993))).
133. Id. at 1054. Notably, the court also held that the licensure scheme did not violate any
First Amendment rights. See id. at 1053 (“[E]ven if a speech interest is implicated, California’s
licensing scheme passes First Amendment scrutiny.”).
134. Fultz, supra note 113, at 572.
135. Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
136. Id. at 609.
137. Id. at 610.
138. See id. at 611 (noting that states’ capacity to regulate the practice of dentistry is “not
open to dispute”).
139. Id.
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Further, states may employ their police powers to protect citizens
from incompetent professionals by delineating professional
140
standards. This power is intimately tied with, yet not identical to, a
141
state’s licensing authority. When a professional violates a state’s
professional standards, that state may impose sanctions to promote
142
143
and shelter public safety. Sanctions may include monetary fines
144
and license suspension or revocation. Although these sanctions
cannot undo the harm already incurred by patients or clients, they
145
assist in preventing any future harm.
II. PHYSICIAN SPEECH AS FREE SPEECH
A fog of confusion surrounds the professional speech doctrine as
146
applied to physician speech. Much of this perplexity stems from
Justice Douglas’s aforementioned statement that “[t]he right of the
doctor to advise his patients according to his best lights seems so

140. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he state
may have an interest in shielding the public against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the
irresponsible . . . .”); see also Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Thomas
to emphasize the compelling state interest in regulating the medical profession through
licensing).
141. See Semler, 294 U.S. at 611 (recognizing that states “may require licenses and establish
supervision by an administrative board”).
142. See Lap v. Axelrod, 467 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (upholding a
revocation of a license as a discipline to protect clients from individuals that commit crimes
intimately tied with the industry that they are licensed to participate in).
143. See Trisha’s One Stop, Inc. v. Office of Fin. Regulation, 130 So.3d 285, 288 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2014) (fining an operator of a check-cashing business under the state’s professional
regulatory authority).
144. Arthur v. D.C. Nurses’ Examining Bd., 459 A.2d 141, 147 (D.C. 1983) (citing Proctor v.
Hackers’ Bd., 268 A.2d 267, 269 (D.C. 1970)).
145. Fultz, supra note 113, at 573.
146. See, e.g., Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 44 (referencing the “gray area” regarding the
standard that courts apply to restrictions imposed on physician speech); Renee Newman Knake,
Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 645 (2011) (explaining
that the level of protection afforded to attorney advice is not clear); David T. Moldenhauer,
Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amendment Limitations on the
Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 843 (2006) (“The
regulation of professional speech is one of the least developed areas of First Amendment
doctrine.”); W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 305
(2001) (noting that the manner in which the First Amendment should apply to attorneys is
“[o]ne of the most important unanswered questions in legal ethics”); Jacob M. Victor, Note,
Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The California Approach, Its Limitations, and
Potential Alternatives, 123 YALE L.J. 1532, 1578 (2014) (classifying the question as to how much
First Amendment protection extends to professional speech as “complicated”).
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obviously within First Amendment rights as to need no extended
147
discussion.” Ever since Justice Douglas’s comments, however, the
Supreme Court has offered little guidance into the rights of physicians
148
to speak to their patients. Although it is beyond the scope of this
Note to fully expound upon the boundaries of the professional speech
doctrine, this Part argues that physician speech should at least be
covered by the First Amendment’s protective shield. Section A
outlines the origins of the professional speech doctrine. Section B
discusses the coverage of the First Amendment, and summarizes the
majority’s divergent approaches in his Wollschlaeger opinions.
Section C offers a different justification than the Wollschlaeger
majority’s for First Amendment coverage of physician speech and
proposes an alternative test to determine when physician speech is
covered.
A. The Professional Speech Doctrine
Professional speech is generally defined as “personalized
communication given in the context of a fiduciary-like relationship
between a person who adheres to a shared body of professional
149
knowledge and values and that person’s client.” Although different
150
151
or commercial speech,
professional speech
from political
152
nonetheless deserves First Amendment protection.
153
Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe v. SEC is often credited
154
with establishing the contours of the professional speech doctrine.
In Lowe, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Securities
147. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For an example of a
court struggling with the diverging interests in protecting physician speech, see Stuart v.
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (addressing North Carolina’s Woman’s Right to Know
Act).
148. See Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 44 (stating that “[t]he Court has offered only
cursory comments” discussing physicians’ First Amendment rights).
149. Moldenhauer, supra note 146, at 892.
150. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (explaining that “[c]ontentbased regulations are presumptively invalid” under the First Amendment).
151. For a discussion of the First Amendment’s coverage of commercial speech, see infra
notes 293–301 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 235 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding that
professional speech deserves First Amendment protection).
153. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211–36 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
154. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 7, at 842–43 (using Justice White’s concurrence in
Lowe to outline the professional-speech doctrine’s foundational contours); see also Keighley,
supra note 8, at 2368 (employing Justice White’s concurrence to establish the contours of the
professional speech doctrine).
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Exchange Commission could forbid unlicensed “investment advisers”
from publishing general investment advice and commentary in
155
various securities newsletters. The unlicensed advisors “contend[ed]
that such an injunction str[uck] at the very foundation of the freedom
156
of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship.” The majority
opinion, however, avoided the constitutional question by concluding
that the petitioners were not “investment adviser[s]” as statutorily
157
defined. Thus, the regulation was inapplicable and the SEC could
158
not restrict the petitioners from publicizing their newsletters.
Justice White, however, concluded that the petitioners were
159
“investment adviser[s].”
And so, he could not dodge the
constitutional question at issue: whether the SEC violated the First
Amendment by preventing unlicensed investment advisers from
160
publishing general investment advice. Justice White recognized the
diverging interests at issue. On one hand, the First Amendment
161
guarantees the freedom of speech for American citizens. On the
other, the government has the power to license and regulate those
162
who desire to pursue a specific profession or vocation. Although the
latter interest is undoubtedly legitimate, certain regulatory measures
163
leap past the line of permissibility and become speech restrictions.
As applied to Lowe, that is exactly what the SEC did—it
implemented a “direct restraint on freedom of speech and of the
164
press.” Justice White therefore concurred with the majority in
result, but would have struck down the SEC’s regulation as
165
unconstitutional.
Justice White’s opinion gave significant guidance to later courts
on how to distinguish between permissible regulations of professional

155. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 183.
156. Id. at 189 (citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938)).
157. Id. at 211 (White, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 228.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 230 (“At some point, a measure is no longer a regulation of a profession but a
regulation of speech or of the press; beyond that point, the statute must survive the level of
scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment.”).
164. Id. at 233.
165. Id. at 236.
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166

conduct and impermissible infringements of freedom of speech. For
example, governments may “enact[] generally applicable licensing
provisions limiting the class of persons who may practice the
167
profession.” Professionals are categorized as those “who take[] the
affairs of a client personally in hand and purport[] to exercise
judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s individual
168
needs and circumstances.” It is irrelevant that licensing provisions
may implicate speech concerns—any burden is merely “incidental to
169
the conduct of the profession.” Conversely, where no personal
170
government
nexus exists between professional and client,
restrictions stop operating as proper regulations of professional
171
practice that only incidentally impact speech. Simply put, there is no
profession being regulated. Instead, they serve as a direct regulation
of speech subject to heightened scrutiny under the First
172
Amendment. Justice White did not address, however, the level of
First Amendment protection dedicated to speech regulated within the
professional-client nexus.

166. Id. at 231–33. Markedly, Justice White cited Justice Jackson’s concurrence positively
when he asserted that “the state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without
its license,” but could not “make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to
follow or reject any school of medical thought.” Id. at 231 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 544–48 (1945)).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 232.
169. Id.
170. Suppose a physician spoke at a political rally for or against abortion regulation. In this
hypothetical circumstance, there would be no personal nexus between the professional and
client; the physician is speaking on his or her own accord. On the other hand, consider a statute
that restricts the practice of unlicensed certified public accountants. See Accountant’s Soc. of
Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 603 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing a similar statutory scheme). The
statute would implicate speech falling within the personal nexus between professional and
client, as the implicated speech would be flowing from a professional to a client. Id. at 605.
171. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring).
172. See id. at 232 & n.11 (citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931))
(stating that regulating where no professional relationship exists “becomes [a] regulation of
speaking . . . subject to the First Amendment[]”); see also Robert Kry, The “Watchman for
Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 953 (2000)
(explaining that in Justice White’s test, the personal nexus serves as the “distinction between
fully protected publishing activities and professional practice”); Moldenhauer, supra note 146, at
885 (opining that the distinction between the state’s power to enact restrictions on professions
turns on whether a “personal nexus” exists between a professional and their client).

WEISS IN PRINTER FINAL

820

12/22/2015 10:34 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:801

B. First Amendment Coverage of Physician Speech
The first question in any First Amendment analysis is whether
173
First Amendment protection is triggered. As Professor Frederick
174
Schauer explains, this is primarily a question of coverage. Certain
acts, words, or behaviors simply do not enjoy any First Amendment
175
protection whatsoever. Because the speech is not covered, it “does
176
not present a First Amendment issue at all.” Put differently, “[t]he
177
First Amendment just does not show up.”
1. The First Attempt—Conditioning the First Amendment on a
Categorization of Conduct. Judge Tjoflat, in writing the original
majority’s opinion, began by recognizing that professional speech is
178
not wholly removed from First Amendment coverage. Instead,
professional speech is subject to a spectrum of constitutional
179
protection. At one extreme, professionals “engaged in a public
180
dialogue”
receive the greatest amount of First Amendment
protection and are thus presumptively covered by the First
Amendment. At the midpoint of the spectrum lies speech that
requires professionals to communicate specific information to their
173. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and
Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 395, 397 (2014) (illuminating that the preliminary question is
whether the First Amendment covers the expression); see also Frederick Schauer, Categories
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 268 (1981) (explaining
that the First Amendment is implicated when speech at issue “is set off by the [F]irst
[A]mendment for special protection”). This “coverage” requirement is not unique to the First
Amendment—it is pertinent to other constitutional rights. See, e.g., United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the threshold inquiry in Second
Amendment challenges is “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee”).
174. Schauer, supra note 108, at 1769.
175. See id. (“The acts, behaviors, and restrictions not encompassed by the First
Amendment at all—the events that remain wholly untouched by the First Amendment—are . . .
consequently measured against no First Amendment standard whatsoever.”).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1218 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that
First Amendment protections reach their pinnacle when a professional speaks publicly on a
matter of public concern, but reach “a nadir” when a professional “speaks privately, in the
course of exercising his or her professional judgment, to a person receiving the professional’s
services”).
179. See id. at 1219 (referencing the “spectrum” of professional speech).
180. Id. at 1223 (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227 (9th Cir. 2014)). This type of
speech receives strict scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)
(recognizing that regulations that target speech because of its content receive “the most
exacting” constitutional scrutiny).
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181

clients. At the other extreme is the “regulation of professional
conduct, where the state’s power is great, even though such regulation
182
may have an incidental effect on speech.” In this scenario, any
implicated speech is simply incidental to the permissible regulation
183
and thus is not covered by the First Amendment.
Using this conduct-regulation theory of the professional speech
doctrine’s coverage, the majority upheld each challenged provision of
184
FOPA without applying heightened scrutiny.
The inquiry
185
provision applied to speech in the physician’s examination room,
where the “personal nexus between professional and client” is most
186
acute. Further, it merely informed physicians that, according to
Florida, inquiring into firearm ownership was not a practice of good
187
medicine. Thus, the court categorized the provision as a “regulation
of professional conduct” that fell outside of the First Amendment’s
188
189
Likewise, the record-keeping provision
regulated
coverage.
professional conduct, and any burden on speech was merely
190
incidental to FOPA’s regulation of the medical field. Although the
191
192
discrimination and harassment provisions may not have regulated
193
speech at all, if they did, any burden was considered incidental to
194
the regulation of professional conduct. Consequently, the majority
181. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1223 (citing Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228). This Note argues that
this speech receives intermediate scrutiny. See infra Part III.A.
182. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229). Although not
discussed in the majority’s original opinion, the First Amendment does apply to certain types of
conduct. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional
Rights, Inc. (FAIR II), 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006)) (explaining that First Amendment protection
only extends to conduct that is “inherently expressive”).
183. See Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1217 (finding that FOPA only incidentally affects
physician speech, and thus, fell outside of the First Amendment’s coverage).
184. See id. at 1226 (holding that FOPA does not trigger First Amendment protection).
185. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (2014).
186. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White,
J., concurring)).
187. Id. at 1219–20.
188. Id. at 1220 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(plurality opinion)).
189. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(1).
190. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1221.
191. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(5).
192. Id. § 790.338(6).
193. See Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1221 (asserting that the discrimination provision validly
regulates professional conduct and “only incidentally—if at all—affects physician speech”); see
also id. (claiming that harassment can involve speech).
194. Id.
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held that FOPA fell outside First Amendment coverage, and
195
therefore did not facially violate the Constitution.
2. Taking a Second Shot—The Majority’s Two-Dimensional Test.
After sua sponte vacating its original opinion, the Eleventh Circuit’s
revised Wollschlaeger opinion disregarded the conduct–speech
distinction originally employed and instead focused on “the landscape
196
of professional speech.” The majority began by observing that
“[t]here is a difference, for First Amendment purposes, between . . .
professionals’ speech to the public at large versus their direct
197
personalized speech with clients.” Speech voiced by a professional
in support of “his or her profession and within the confines of a
professional-client relationship,” for instance, is properly considered
198
professional speech. On the other hand, “speech uttered by a
professional that is irrelative to the practice of his or her profession
and outside a particular professional-client relationship likely falls
199
beyond the purview of professional speech.”
To help distinguish between professional speech deserving of
protection and undeserving nonprofessional speech, the majority
proposed a two-dimensional test that turns on “the professional
effectivity of the speech—whether the physician is speaking in
furtherance of the practice of medicine or not, and the relational
context of the speech—whether the physician is speaking within a
200
fiduciary relationship or not.” When considered in tandem, these
two factors divide speech uttered by physicians into four categories:
(1) speech uttered by a physician “to the public, in furtherance of the
practice of medicine”; (2) speech uttered by a physician “to a client,
in furtherance of the practice of medicine”; (3) speech uttered by a
physician “to a client, on a matter irrelative to the practice of
medicine”; and (4) speech uttered by a physician “to the public, on a
201
matter irrelative to the practice of medicine.”
At issue in
Wollschlaeger was the second category—speech uttered by a

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 1226.
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 886 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 887 (quoting Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011)).
Id. (citing King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014)).
Id. (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring)).
Id. at 888.
Id.
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professional “to a client, in furtherance of the practice of medicine.”
Rather than focusing primarily on whether FOPA targeted conduct
or speech, however, the majority conceded that FOPA implicated the
First Amendment and proceeded to subject the speech to heightened
203
scrutiny.
The majority framed its analysis around the government’s
interest in regulating physician speech. With regards to the
“professional effectivity of the speech,” the majority stated that “the
government’s interest in regulating the profession for the protection
of the public . . . is strongest when a professional speaks in
204
furtherance of his profession.” By contrast, the professional’s
interest in speaking freely is “strongest when he speaks on matters
unrelated to his profession and weakest when he speaks in
205
furtherance of his profession.” As for the relational context of
speech, the majority opined that “the government has a strong
interest in policing the boundaries of the relationship to protect the
206
weaker party from exploitation.” When “[o]utside the confines of
such relationships, the government’s interest in protecting the listener
wanes, and instead the interest of the physician’s audience in
207
obtaining information reaches its zenith.” Ultimately, the court held
that FOPA passed constitutional muster under intermediate
208
scrutiny.
3. The Coverage of Physician Speech. Presumably, the majority
vacated its original opinion and substituted in its place a revised
opinion because the former ignored certain intricacies of First
Amendment coverage. As explained by Judge Wilson in his original
dissent, regulations must be subjected to “heightened scrutiny
whenever the government restricts speech because of disagreement
209
with the message it conveys.” Certainly, the state may implement

202. Id.; see also id. at 869 (discussing that FOPA regulates physicians’ inquiries into
whether a patient owns a firearm for the purpose of medical care).
203. See id. at 891 (“[W]e conclude that [FOPA] is a regulation of professional speech.”).
204. Id. at 889.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 900.
209. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1236 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011)). Judge Wilson
chided the original majority opinion for creating an improper exception to First Amendment
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licensing and regulatory schemes to restrict certain professional
210
but physicians do not “simply abandon their First
speech,
211
Amendment rights when they commence practicing a profession.”
Rather, “speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for
212
purposes of the First Amendment.” And speech stemming from the
physician–patient relationship is presumptively encompassed within
213
the First Amendment’s protective sphere.
214
Further, courts cannot simply play a “labeling game” by
designating speech as conduct to dodge First Amendment scrutiny.
Even when certain laws regulate conduct, they are nonetheless
subject to First Amendment scrutiny when “the conduct triggering
215
coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message.”
To determine whether a regulation targets speech or conduct, courts
216
generally focus on the “transmission of ideas.” Thus, the state’s
ability to regulate speech turns on whether that speech is
217
“communicative.” Regulations targeting conduct concern speech’s
“noncommunicative component,” whereas regulations targeting
218
And
speech concern speech’s “communicative component.”

coverage. See id. (“The word ‘whenever’ does not invite exceptions, but the Majority creates
one anyway.”).
210. For a discussion of the state’s ability to regulate the classes of individuals able to speak
as a professional, see supra Part II.C. See also Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir.
2014) (referencing King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014), to explain
that licensing provides confidence to clients that their lives are in safe hands).
211. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 247.
212. King, 767 F.3d at 229.
213. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (dictum) (“[T]raditional relationships
such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment
from Government regulation, even when subsidized by the Government.”). Although this
statement is dictum, it nonetheless hints that physician speech is within First Amendment
coverage.
214. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
215. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).
216. Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the
First Amendment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1423, 1475 (2014).
217. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580 (1978) (explaining
that First Amendment protections are aimed at those governmental actions focused on
“communicative impact”); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws,
Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1314 (2005) (collecting cases). But see Schauer, supra note 173, at 279
(“[Communicative impact] theory is incomplete, however, unless it provides some guidance,
derived again from the deep theory of the principle of free speech, in determining what species
of communicative impact are covered and what species of communicative impact are not.”).
218. Volokh, supra note 217, at 1314.
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communicative speech, even if uttered by a professional to his client,
219
must be subject to heightened scrutiny.
220
For example, in King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey the
Third Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute
that restricted licensed counselors from partaking in “sexual
orientation change efforts” with patients younger than eighteen years
221
of age. The plaintiffs challenged this statutory scheme, alleging that
it violated the First Amendment by restricting the physician’s right to
222
speak. The court held that New Jersey’s statutory scheme regulated
223
physician speech—not simply conduct —because New Jersey
prohibited a professional practice that is carried out by way of verbal
224
communication. Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the First
Amendment does cover physician speech and, as such, required the
225
application of the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny.
226
Similarly, in Stuart v. Camnitz the Fourth Circuit addressed the
227
constitutionality of North Carolina’s Woman’s Right to Know Act.
The Act required physicians to perform an ultrasound, display the
image, and describe the fetus before an abortion “even if the woman
228
actively ‘averts her eyes’ and ‘refuses to hear.’” A group of
physicians filed suit, arguing that the compelled speech violated the
229
First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the
statute regulated conduct, “insofar as it directs doctors to do certain
230
things in the context of treating a patient.” But that was not the end
of the matter—the statute required doctors to communicate the
231
descriptions mandated verbally. Thus, both professional conduct
219. Cf. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1220 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (suggesting that regulations of
professional communication are subject to “some degree of scrutiny”).
220. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
221. Id. at 221 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1–55 (West 2013)).
222. Id. at 222.
223. See id. at 233 (“While the function of this speech does not render it ‘conduct’ that is
wholly outside the scope of the First Amendment, it does place it within a recognized category
of speech that is not entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.”).
224. See id. (holding that professional speech receives some diminished protection under the
First Amendment).
225. See id. (holding that classifying the regulation at issue as professional speech “does not
end [the constitutional] inquiry,” and thus, moving on to determine the level of scrutiny).
226. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
227. Id. at 242.
228. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90–21.85(b) (2011)).
229. Id. at 243.
230. Id. at 248.
231. Id. at 245.
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232

and professional speech were implicated. Consequently, the Fourth
Circuit held that the Act burdened physician speech and thus
233
triggered First Amendment coverage.
Three characteristics of the speech at issue in both King and
Camnitz are integral when considering First Amendment coverage of
physician speech. First, the speech at issue occurred in a professional
relationship—the physician–patient relationship. Second, the speech
in both scenarios, whether compelled or prohibited, was
234
communicative. If the “speech” at issue were noncommunicative,
235
the regulations would not enjoy First Amendment coverage.
Finally, the regulations in both cases were content based. Were the
regulations content neutral, they may have avoided First Amendment
236
coverage. All three of these characteristics are necessary for
physician speech to receive First Amendment protection.
C. Finding the Target: Rationalizing the Coverage and Boundaries of
Physician Speech
The discussion up to this point has served as a backdrop to the
conflicting Wollschlaeger opinions. This Part may add to that
confusion by arguing that the second Wollschlaeger opinion, which
concluded that FOPA implicated the First Amendment, was correct
in part—albeit for the wrong reasons. First, this Part argues that the
“government’s interest in regulating the profession for the protection
237
of the public” does not justify First Amendment coverage of

232. See id. at 248 (“[The statute] requires doctors to ‘say’ as well as ‘do.’”).
233. See id. at 251 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 229–30 (1985) (White, J., concurring))
(holding that regulations restricting the free speech rights of professionals must pass
constitutional scrutiny and adding that “[t]hough physicians and other professionals may be
subject to regulations by the state that restrict their First Amendment freedoms when acting in
the course of their professions, professionals do not leave their speech rights at the office door”
(citation omitted)).
234. See id. at 245 (explaining that “the display of the sonogram is plainly an expressive act,”
and thus, is sufficiently communicative to engender First Amendment protection); King v.
Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding “that the verbal communication” at
issue is communicative, and thus, enjoys First Amendment protection).
235. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (citing NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Union, 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)) (recognizing that if the
restricted speech was noncommunicative, it could properly be regulated as conduct); see also
supra notes 214–33 and accompanying text (distinguishing between speech and conduct).
236. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1241 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that Lowe v. SEC implies a requirement of content neutrality to qualify as
a permissible regulation of professional conduct).
237. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 889 (11th Cir. 2015).
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physician speech. Rather, the centrality of trust in all physician–
patient relationships justifies First Amendment protection. Second,
this Part rationalizes when the First Amendment should cover
physician speech. Particularly, it outlines an alternative test for when
physician speech should enjoy First Amendment coverage.
1. Why The First Amendment Should Cover Physician Speech.
First, regulations that restrict physician speech substantially
undermine the foundation of the physician–patient relationship—
238
trust. Trust in the medical context is defined as a psychological state
on the part of both patients and physicians that entails an “optimistic
239
attitude towards one’s vulnerability.” Trust is not simply desirable
in the physician–patient relationship; it serves as “the ‘glue’ that holds
240
the relationship together and makes it possible.” Trust is “essential
241
and unavoidable.” And although not unique to medicine, trust is
more important in the physician–patient relationship than many
242
relationships. In fact, one of the very reasons patients seek medical
treatment is to obtain medical care and uninhibited medicinal
243
information. But without trust, patients would not possess enough
faith in “their care-givers . . . to lay themselves bare, both physically
244
and emotionally, so the true causes of illness can be understood.”
Patients trust physicians because they believe they are receiving
245
their physicians’ expert opinion.
When regulations prohibit
physicians from inquiring about a certain topic, however, that trust is
246
diminished. Diminishing trust and reducing disclosure is significant.
It misleads patients’ medical decisionmaking because they “have no
238. See Post, supra note 8, at 977 (explaining that trust is embedded in the physician–
patient relationship).
239. Mark Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 474 (2002).
240. Id. at 470.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 471 (explaining that medicinal trust “is paralleled only in fraternal, family, or love
relationships”).
243. Cf. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014) (justifying First
Amendment coverage of information that “facilitates the ‘free flow of commercial information,’
in which . . . the intended recipients . . . have a strong interest” (quoting Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976))).
244. Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical
Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423, 426 (2001).
245. See Post, supra note 8, at 978 (“[Patients] wish to receive knowledge that our doctors
can uniquely provide . . . .”).
246. See id. at 977–78 (noting that physicians assume a fiduciary obligation to communicate
knowledge that the patient can rely on to decide what their medical care ought to be).
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comparable alternative means of acquiring medical information.”
Further, restricting physician speech undermines the patient’s
expectations because the physician is unable to supply the care that
248
the patient seeks. But it is not just patients who rely on trust in a
medical examining room—physicians trust that “patient[s] will
249
candidly disclose information necessary for the best treatment.”
Therefore, regulations that breach the examination room walls by
restricting physician speech vitiate the physician–patient relationship
and impose a net-negative result.
The second Wollschlaeger majority opinion, however, argues that
patients are relatively powerless in a physician’s examination room
and that states bolster physician–patient trust by “regulat[ing] the
practice of professions to ‘shield the public against the untrustworthy,
250
the incompetent, or the irresponsible.’” Thus, the government’s
interest in regulating physician speech is strongest “[w]hen a
physician speaks to a patient in furtherance of the practice of
251
medicine.” But this argument is unavailing. First, the allusion to
“shield[ing] the public against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or
the irresponsible” is inapposite because that statement was in
252
reference to a licensing regime;
indubitably, states have the
authority to protect patients from the incompetent through a
253
licensing scheme. Second, allowing the state to regulate speech
through conscripted physicians, as FOPA does, destroys patient trust
254
By replacing
by increasing risk of governmental coercion.
physicians’ medical judgment with state-mandated silence, FOPA

247. Berg, supra note 2, at 247.
248. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253–54 (4th Cir. 2014).
249. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 33.
250. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 892 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see also Halberstam, supra note 7,
at 845 (referencing the imbalance of authority in the physician–patient relationship).
251. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 889; see also Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 247 (justifying the
potential state regulatory authority over physician speech on the State’s “regulation . . . [that]
‘provide[s] clients with the confidence they require to put their health or their livelihood in the
hands’” of a physician (quoting King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014))).
252. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 892 (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 545 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
253. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring). In fact, Justice Jackson would likely
reject the majority’s assertion that the government possesses a strong interest in regulating
physician speech. See id. (“Likewise, the state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an
occupation without its license but I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to
speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought.” (emphasis added)).
254. Berg, supra note 2, at 230–31.
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undermines the trust of the physician–patient relationship. In fact,
this damage is “magnified when the physician is compelled to deliver
255
the state’s preferred message in his or her own voice.” Patients do
256
not know whether their physician is speaking, or the state. Likewise,
when states prohibit physician speech, patients do not know whether
their physicians’ silence is based on medical conclusions or the state’s
mandated preferences. This information imbalance empowers the
state to endorse partisan views by restraining the availability of
targeted information and deceiving the patient’s decisionmaking
257
process.
Distinguishing between compelled physician speech and
prohibited physician speech only serves to highlight the flaws in the
majority’s rationale. When the state compels speech, the flow of
information is uninhibited. Nonetheless, as in Camnitz, the patient
258
has the ability to ignore any communication. Conversely, when the
state prohibits certain speech, patients have no sufficiently reliable
alternative avenue to obtain that information. They cannot simply
ignore the undesired speech. It “is never open to contemplation,
259
investigation, or to being discounted or rejected.”
This is
exponentially more disconcerting for medical patients—potentially
critical information is off the table for consideration, and patients are
260
restrained from choosing what is in their best interest. Allowing the

255. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 253.
256. Consider again the North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act, which compels
physicians to provide specific information and take certain steps before conducting an abortion.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90–21.85(a) (2011); see also supra notes 226–34 (describing the Act’s
requirements in greater detail). Patients are left in the dark as to the source of this information,
particularly, whether the state prescribed it, or whether their physician did.
257. Berg, supra note 2, at 231.
258. See Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 252 (discussing implications in North Carolina for
implementing a statute that requires women to forcefully ignore physician communication). In
fact, North Carolina explicitly recognized this point while codifying the Woman’s Right to
Know Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90–21.85(b) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prevent a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the displayed images or from refusing to
hear the simultaneous explanation and medical description.”).
259. Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control: Furthering Partisan Interests at the
Expense of Good Health, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 338 (2014); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing the inherent fears when “[b]oth those
desiring to receive [a] message . . . and those wishing to send it to them are prevented from
doing so”). In fact, the Wollschlaeger majority acknowledged “society’s interest in the free flow
of information.” Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 890 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1975)).
260. Cf. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 478–79
(2011) (discussing the marketplace of ideas as a rationale for First Amendment protection). It is
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state to restrict physician speech under the guise of protecting
patients undermines any trust in their physician, and thus, only serves
261
to harm patients more.
Second, even commercial speech has enjoyed First Amendment
262
coverage for roughly forty years. This coverage is rationalized by
the desire to shelter “the free flow of commercial communication in
263
the marketplace.”
Thus, the First Amendment weighs the
government’s interest in regulating the commercial speaker against
264
the recipient’s need or desire for the information. The First
Amendment covers commercial speech when the speech is not false,
265
misleading, or does not involve unlawful activity. This is because
misleading speech subverts the rationale for protecting commercial
speech under the First Amendment—“the informational function of
266
advertising.”
Physician speech deserves First Amendment coverage for many
of the same reasons that commercial speech enjoys such coverage.
Placing commercial speech behind the First Amendment’s protective
shield implicates the widely accepted argument that citizens possess a
right to accrue “knowledge and thereby retain control over one’s own
267
thought processes.” Regulatory schemes that restrict physicians’
true that states may attempt to censor harmful information by restricting physician speech. The
First Amendment, however, should still cover this type of restriction; the distinguishing analysis
would occur in protection. For a discussion of First Amendment protection, see infra notes 287–
303 and accompanying text.
261. See Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication and the First Amendment After
Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 101, 114 (2012) (describing the harm that stems from
depriving patients of necessary medical information).
262. Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are equally clear that
the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising.”), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee 501 U.S. 808 (1991), with Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (protecting commercial speech so that the state may not “keep[] the
public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering”).
263. Alison L. Stohr, Comment, Valor for Sale: Applying the Commercial Speech Exception
to Self-Promoting Individuals, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 455, 465 (2013).
264. See id. at 463 (justifying protection of commercial speech by analyzing the expression’s
nature in accordance with the governmental interest served in regulating that expression); see
also ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 42–43 (2012) (explaining that the
Constitution generally protects the speaker’s expression, but lower levels of protection for
commercial speech are rationalized by the decision to concentrate on safeguarding the listener).
265. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
266. Id. at 563 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
267. Berg, supra note 2, at 245 (citations omitted); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965) (“[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
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ability to speak with their patients, even under the guise of protecting
patients, inhibit this right. Patients are constricted in their ability to
amass critical medical information. Additionally, commercial speech
by its very nature is motivated by pecuniary gain and may not be in
the recipient’s best interest. But physicians are not primarily
268
motivated by their own financial gain. Their duty is to provide the
medical care that is in their patients’ best interest. The result is a
quasi-regulated profession that mandates only certain speech as
appropriate. If self-interested, fiscally driven speech receives First
Amendment coverage, patient-interested physician speech should as
269
well.
2. Building a Test—When Physician Speech Should be Covered
by the First Amendment. Physician speech should receive First
Amendment coverage when (1) the speech is rendered within the
scope of the doctor–patient relationship, and (2) the information
given or requested is truthful and nonmisleading. First, physician
speech should only enjoy First Amendment coverage when the trust
of the physician–patient relationship is intact. Without trust, the
270
foundation of the physician–patient relationship is absent. As no
271
“personal nexus” exists between physician and patient, the state
272
lacks the supervisory capability to regulate the medical field.
contract the spectrum of available knowledge.”); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242,
1255 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Our review of the Supreme Court’s decisions confirms that the First
Amendment does not merely prohibit the government from enacting laws that censor
information, but additionally encompasses the positive right of public access to information and
ideas.”); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2
(asserting that the “right to know” should be considered as integral to the freedom of speech
and expression under the First Amendment).
268. For a discussion of the physician’s duties to the patient, see infra notes 275–78 and
accompanying text.
269. This is even more so the case when the speech is accurate and nonmisleading. See
Amarin Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, No. 15-cv-3588 (PAE), 2015 WL 4720039, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
7, 2015) (choosing to rule “in favor of giving doctors more, not less, information” in a
commercial speech setting).
270. See Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life
Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1091,
1100 (1999) (“[T]rust is essential to the way medical treatment decisions are made . . . . [It] is
essential to the ethical foundation of the physician-patient relationship.”). For a discussion of
the importance of trust in the physician–patient relationship, see supra notes 238–61 and
accompanying text.
271. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
272. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[O]utside the doctorpatient relationship, doctors are constitutionally equivalent to soapbox orators and
pamphleteers, and their speech receives robust protection under the First Amendment.”).
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Without a trustful physician–patient relationship, the physician’s
273
speech transforms to “speech by a physician.” Consequently, the
274
physician-speech doctrine would be inapplicable.
A strong gauge for testing whether the trust of the physician–
patient relationship is established is analyzing whether the physician
275
has a duty of faith, trust, and confidence to the patient. Numerous
courts agree that “physicians owe a fiduciary obligation to their
patients, stemming from the intrinsic nature of the physician-patient
276
relationship.” Because the physician is obligated to act in the
277
patient’s best interests, the state need not implement regulatory
schemes to police improper medical practices. When physician speech
278
is not in furtherance of their physician duties, however, it does not
fall within the scope of the physician–patient relationship.
Consequently, the trust inherent in the physician–patient relationship
is absent, and the speech cannot be considered physician speech for
First Amendment coverage purposes.

273. To clarify this analysis, it is helpful to make a nuanced distinction—the difference
between “physician speech” and “speech by a physician.” On one hand, physician speech is
generally understood as speech “uttered in the course of professional practice.” Halberstam,
supra note 7, at 843. On the other hand, speech by a physician is precisely that: “speech . . .
uttered by a professional.” Id. This distinction is critical; the state has no authority to restrict
speech solely because a physician uttered the statement. Suppose a physician asks a long-time
patient how his or her family’s recent vacation was. Or whether his or her child is engaged yet.
The state is unable to restrict this kind of speech; it is the archetypal “speech by a physician.”
274. See Post, supra note 8, at 952 (explaining that not all speech during the practice of
medicine qualifies as “professional speech”). One example given by Professor Robert Post is if a
physician trips while examining a patient. Id. Any shouts of pain, even those occurring whilst
examining a patient, are not “professional speech.” Id.
275. Cf. Fiduciary Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a fiduciary
duty as “[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to
the beneficiary . . . ; a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another
person and in the best interests of the other person”).
276. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of
Physicians to “Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services That Are Not Medically
Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 369 (2009) (listing cases that recognize the fiduciary
nature of the physician–patient relationship).
277. See Ison v. McFall, 400 S.W.2d 243, 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that physicians
owe a fiduciary relationship to their patients, and, as such, must advise their patients if they plan
to use any medical treatment that will not be beneficial).
278. In the medical field, the duty owed is to act in the patient’s best interests. For a
discussion of “the physician’s fiduciary duty to act in the patient’s best interest,” see Swartz,
supra note 261, at 122.
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Suppose that a patient is a personal friend of his physician.
During the course of the examination, the physician asks whether his
friend would like to go hunting or skeet shooting with him. This
inquiry is undoubtedly irrelevant to the patient’s medical interests,
and thus beyond the scope of the fiduciary obligations of the
physician–patient relationship. No “personal nexus” exists in which
the physician “purport[s] to be exercising judgment on behalf” of the
280
281
patient. The physician is speaking as an ordinary citizen. As such,
this speech would not be covered as physician speech for First
282
Amendment purposes.
Second, as in commercial speech, physician speech should only
receive First Amendment coverage when the information conveyed is
truthful and nonmisleading. As previously discussed, commercial
speech receives First Amendment coverage to ensure the necessary
283
free flow of communication. In order to guarantee the circulation of
284
accurate information,
that speech must be truthful and
285
Likewise, as trust is the physician–patient
nonmisleading.
286
relationship’s central component, then physician speech should only
be protected when the conveyed information is accurate. Without
requiring that the information conveyed be truthful and
nonmisleading, any trust between the physician and the patient would

279. This example is adopted from one given by Judge Wilson. See Wollschlaeger v.
Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1250 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
280. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
281. See supra note 273 (distinguishing between physician speech and speech by a
physician). The Wollschlaeger majority considers this speech “to a client, on a matter irrelative
to the practice of medicine.” Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 797 F.3d 859, 888 (11th Cir.
2015).
282. This speech may be covered, however, as “citizen speech.” See Lane v. Franks, 134 S.
Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014) (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)) (recognizing that
citizen speech triggers First Amendment protection); see also supra note 273 (drawing a
distinction between physician speech and speech by a physician).
283. For a discussion of the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech, see supra
notes 262–64 and accompanying text. In fact, misleading information is generally understood to
fall beyond the ambit of First Amendment protection. See Schauer, supra note 108, at 1802
(noting that regulation of misleading information “is generally (and silently) understood not to
raise First Amendment issues”).
284. See Post, supra note 8, at 978 (justifying the protection of commercial speech due to the
accuracy of information).
285. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (identifying whether speech concerns lawful activity or misleading information as the
first step in a four-part commercial speech analysis).
286. See supra notes 238–61, 270, 276–78 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of trust).
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be significantly damaged. The patient would have no assurance that
the physician’s treatment was potentially effective. Consequently, the
physician–patient relationship would be ineffective and patients
would be far less willing to disclose sensitive information.
III. THE PERMISSIBLE REGULATION OF FREE PHYSICIAN SPEECH
Not all speech is treated equally—certain speech does not
287
receive any First Amendment coverage. But the First Amendment
288
also distinguishes between various categories of covered speech.
Thus, once the First Amendment’s protective facilities are triggered,
a second question must be answered: How much security does the
289
speech at issue receive? This concept is framed as an inquiry into
290
“protection.” Certain speech is more deserving of protection, and
291
thus more elusive of governmental restraint. Having shown that the
First Amendment cannot be avoided, Section A demonstrates why
intermediate scrutiny should be the appropriate standard for
physician speech. Section B explains why FOPA does not pass
constitutional muster.

287. For a discussion of the First Amendment’s coverage, see supra Part II.
288. See Schauer, supra note 108, at 1770 ( “[T]he First Amendment makes a difference in
the categories that it covers even when the particular speech that is a member of some covered
category winds up unprotected.”).
289. See id. at 1769 (“When the First Amendment does show up, the full arsenal of First
Amendment rules, principles, standards, distinctions, presumptions, tools, factors, and threepart tests becomes available to determine whether the particular speech will actually wind up
being protected.”).
290. Id.
291. Compare Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 635 (1994) (deciding that
intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard for content-neutral regulations), with City of L.A.
v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221, 230–31 (1987)) (observing that content-based regulations are analyzed under strict
scrutiny).
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As a template for physician-speech protection, it is helpful to
consider the level of protection provided to similar types of speech.
Commercial speech is a compelling analogue. Although commercial
293
speech receives less protection than noncommercial speech, it does
294
not lack protection altogether. This is due to the “‘commonsense
distinction’ between speech proposing a commercial transaction,
which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
295
regulation, and other varieties of speech.” Commercial speech that
296
is generally subject to
receives First Amendment protection
297
intermediate scrutiny.
Commercial speech and physician speech share significant
characteristics justifying their comparison. First, both physician
speech and commercial speech are beneficial to listeners due to the
298
299
“informational function” served. Physicians impart specialized
knowledge that laypersons have little or no familiarity with. Although
the relevant information may be exposed in alternative manners, it
will often be disclosed only through a licensed physician. Second,

292. Although the revised Wollschlaeger majority opinion subjected FOPA to intermediate
scrutiny, its two-dimensional approach left open the possibility that physician speech may be
subject to a lesser level of scrutiny. In deciding what level of scrutiny to apply, the majority
recognized that “when a professional speaks to the public in a nonprofessional capacity, courts
apply the most exacting scrutiny.” Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 892 (11th
Cir. 2015). But the majority conceived of physician speech as “a context in which the State’s
interest in regulating for the protection of the public is more deeply rooted.” Id. Consequently,
although the majority left “the question open, it declare[d] that [physician speech] may actually
be subject to a level of scrutiny more deferential than intermediate scrutiny.” Id. at 909 (Wilson,
J., dissenting).
293. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (explaining that courts
apply “a less than strict, ‘intermediate’ First Amendment test when the government directly
restricts commercial speech”).
294. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (clarifying that the
commercial speech test is “significantly stricter than the rational basis test”).
295. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562
(1980) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
296. For a discussion of First Amendment coverage of commercial speech, see supra notes
262–66 and accompanying text.
297. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate test for commercial speech).
298. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
783 (1978)).
299. See Post, supra note 8, at 979 (referencing “the right of the patient to receive
information”); see also supra note 263 and accompanying text (mentioning the informative
value of commercial speech).
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both types of speech occur in areas that are traditionally exposed to
300
government regulation. States have long regulated physicians to
protect prospective patients and increase the overall quality of
301
healthcare.
Given these salient similarities, physician speech should receive
302
the same degree of First Amendment protection as commercial
303
speech—intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the government must first
establish a “substantial” interest in regulating the physician speech in
304
question. Second, the government must demonstrate that the
305
regulation “directly advances the [asserted] governmental interest.”
Finally, the government must show that the regulation “is not more
306
extensive than . . . necessary to serve that interest.”
B. FOPA’s Constitutional Pitfalls
The Eleventh Circuit’s holding—based on the unfounded
conclusion that restricting physician speech will protect patient
307
privacy and health —reduced physician advice to second-class

300. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (explaining that commercial speech “occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,
436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978))); see also supra Part I.C (documenting the history of medical field
regulations through licensing schemes and protective measures).
301. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Dent v. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889)) (noting the extensive history surrounding medical regulations).
302. To be sure, traditional First Amendment doctrines apply to physician speech, and
should continue to do so. For example, content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on
speech receive strict scrutiny. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“[C]ontent- or viewpoint-based regulation[s] . . . must be closely scrutinized.” (emphasis
omitted)); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Indeed, even content-based
restrictions on speech are ‘presumptively invalid.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
382 (1992))).
303. Some scholars argue against a lower level of protection for commercial speech. See,
e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627,
652–53 (1990) (arguing that commercial speech may be equally as important as noncommercial
speech, and thus, deserves more protection that currently provided). This Note does not argue
that physician speech definitively deserves intermediate scrutiny. Rather, it posits a symmetry
argument: physician speech should enjoy whatever protection commercial speech enjoys (which,
as of this Note’s completion, is intermediate scrutiny). Thus, if the Supreme Court later holds
that commercial speech deserves strict scrutiny, physician speech should as well.
304. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (applying the intermediate scrutiny test in a
commercial speech case).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 883 (11th Cir. 2015) (rationalizing that
FOPA merely explains what is “within the boundaries of good medical practice”).
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308

speech. Instead of protecting patients, restricting physician speech
cements a significant barrier to complete medical care and ignores
309
recommendations by established medical organizations. Physicians
must engage in a full discussion with their patients to give precise
medical advice. Additionally, patients must receive complete
information to reach an informed and autonomous choice in their
medical care. Restricting such important speech imposes “an
310
undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket” on physicians and their
patients.
Under intermediate scrutiny, FOPA must directly advance the
311
government’s interest in protecting patient privacy. It is doubtful,
however, that any legislative action is necessary to further that
312
interest. To the extent that privacy reinforces the permissibility of
any state regulation restricting physician speech, current federal
regulations alleviate that need. One such regulation, the Patient
313
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), unambiguously
ensures a patient’s privacy regarding firearm usage. PPACA prohibits
healthcare practitioners from divulging any information concerning
314
“the lawful ownership or possession of a firearm or ammunition,” or
315
“the lawful use, possession, or storage of a firearm or ammunition.”
Likewise, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
316
Act (HIPAA), safeguards the privacy of information that patients

308. See id. at 909 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (recognizing that even commercial speech is
subject to intermediate scrutiny).
309. See supra note 29 (documenting the recommendations of the American Academy of
Pediatrics and the American Medical Association).
310. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).
311. Normally, the preliminary question is whether the government interest qualifies as
“substantial.” However, Florida concededly has a substantial interest in “promoting the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.” Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (citing
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
312. Florida asserted that FOPA protects the government’s interest in safeguarding
patients’ privacy. See Brief for Appellants at 32, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d
1195 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-14009) (“[FOPA] serves a number of substantial governmental
interests, including . . . the protection of privacy rights . . . .”).
313. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
314. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(c)(5)(A) (2012).
315. Id. § 300gg-17(c)(5)(B).
316. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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317

disclose to physicians. HIPAA also regulates to what extent
healthcare practitioners may disclose their patients’ personal “health
318
information.”
Florida’s analogue, for example, dictates that
healthcare practitioners may not provide a patient’s medical record to
319
a third party without that patient’s permission. Thus, FOPA
burdens more speech than is necessary; HIPAA “already prohibits
320
321
and penalizes” improper plunges into patients’ private matters.
FOPA’s proponents may argue that the privacy interest at stake
is not the divulging of firearm ownership information, but the inquiry
into firearm ownership itself. Thus, so the argument goes, the only
way to safeguard a patient’s privacy is by restricting the inquiry in the
322
first place. But this argument is flawed in three regards. First,
323
information related to firearm ownership is not venerated. In fact,
federal and state statutes require that certain firearm-ownership
324
information be divulged. Second, there is no evidence that patient
privacy is in danger, and therefore, that any protection is
325
unnecessary. Third, the asserted privacy interests “are a mere

317. In some jurisdictions privacy exceptions can diminish HIPAA’s ability to shelter certain
information. See generally Stephanie E. Pearl, Note, HIPAA: Caught in the Cross Fire, 64 DUKE
L.J. 559 (2014) (discussing the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
318. “Health Information” is defined as “any information . . . that: (1) Is created or received
by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or
university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical
or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or
the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.103 (2014).
319. See FLA. STAT. § 456.057(7)(a) (2014) (mandating that physicians may not furnish or
discuss a patient’s medical records with “any person other than the patient or the patient’s legal
representative or other health care practitioners and providers involved in the care or treatment
of the patient, except upon written authorization of the patient”).
320. STAFF OF H.R. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUBCOMM., 113TH SESS., BILL ANALYSIS AND
FISCAL STATEMENT FOR H.R. 155, at 5 (Comm. Print. 2011).
321. Cf. Alex L. Bednar, HIPAA Implications for Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 871, 875 (2004) (emphasizing that HIPAA “serves to enhance trust between patients and
health care providers”).
322. The Wollschlaeger majority agreed with this argument, noting that “[t]he principal
harm targeted by [FOPA] is the collection of information regarding . . . firearm ownership.”
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 898–99 (11th Cir. 2015).
323. Cf. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585 (2000) (holding that an alleged
government interest in protecting voter affiliation was not compelling and noting that the
information is not venerated).
324. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 923 (2012) (requiring certain information to be provided when a
firearm transfers ownership); FLA. STAT. § 790 (regulating the possession of firearms).
325. See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1266 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (explaining
that Florida could not “show that any real [privacy] barriers actually exist or are widespread and
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pretext for the State’s suppression of speech with which it
326
disagrees.” Consequently, any reliance on the patient’s privacy
interest is misplaced.
Moreover, under intermediate scrutiny a statute may not
regulate more extensively than necessary to serve its asserted interest.
But FOPA drastically burdens and undermines legislative policy
choices. Florida, like many states, maintains child access prevention
327
statutes. These statutes “impose criminal liability on adults who
negligently or recklessly leave firearms accessible to minors or
328
otherwise allow minors access to firearms.” Statistics help to explain
the legislative rationale underlying this type of law—firearms in the
home are forty-three times more likely to kill a family member than
329
an intruder. Additionally, deaths by firearms in the home are
330
331
332
commonly the result of an accident, homicide, or suicide. These
statistical findings support the conclusion that physicians should be
encouraged—not restricted—to exercise broad discretion to inquire
into their patients’ ownership, use, and possession of firearms.
Allowing physicians to discuss firearm ownership, use, and possession
with their patients would thus help reinforce Florida’s chosen policy
through the provision of information to those at whom the policy is
aimed. Instead, FOPA precludes an opportunity for physicians to
help effectuate this policy.

pervasive”). In fact, nothing would stop a physician from inquiring into other private matters—
for example, whether a patient is sexually active or uses contraceptive devices.
326. Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 43; see also Eugene Volokh, Court Upholds Florida Law
Restricting Doctor-Patient Speech About Guns, WASH. POST (July 29, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/29/court-upholds-restriction-ondoctor-patient-speech-about-guns [http://www.perma.cc/RC9M-CKXC] (explaining that FOPA
is “about preventing doctors from spreading what many gun rights supporters see as unsound
anti-gun propaganda”).
327. See Erin P. Lynch, Comment, Federal Gun Storage Legislation: Will This Keep Guns
Out of the Hands of Our Children?, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 211, 220 (1999)
(discussing the history of child-access-prevention statutes). In fact, Florida was the first state to
enact such a statute. Id.; see 1989 Fla. Laws 2739, 2739–42 (codifying, in Senate Bill 18-B,
Florida’s regulation regarding the safe storage of firearms).
328. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 31.
329. Brian Falls, Legislation Prohibiting Physicians from Asking Patients About Guns, 39 J.
PSYCHOL. & L. 441, 446 (2011).
330. See id. at 447 (noting that accidents cause most domestic child firearm deaths).
331. See id. (illustrating that 41 percent of “gun-related homicides would not occur without
access to guns in the home”).
332. See id. (“Gunshots are by far the most lethal method of suicide attempts; up to 96%
result in death, whereas overdose is lethal in about 2–7% of cases.”).
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Additionally, the patient’s right to refuse to answer diminishes
the efficacy of the inquiry and record-keeping provisions. Under
§ 790.338(4) of the Florida Statutes, patients have the right to
“decline to answer or provide any information regarding ownership
333
334
of a firearm” without fear of physician retaliation. Consequently,
patients are capable of protecting their own privacy beyond any
assistance from the State’s inquiry and record-keeping protections.
Since these two provisions are functionally irrelevant after
considering § 790.338(4), FOPA burdens more speech than necessary
to further Florida’s substantial government interest in protecting
privacy.
Similarly, FOPA burdens more speech than necessary by
banning all inquiries related to the possession of firearms instead of
tailoring the prohibition to only those who object. Undoubtedly,
some patients appreciate inquiries regarding firearm ownership, use,
and possession as part of their preventative care. Florida could
provide those patients their desired care by implementing a carve-out
335
provision that allows welcomed inquiries. But FOPA does not
include an exception that allows a patient to consent to the inquiry.
Rather, it silences all inquiries into firearm ownership, use, and
possession—even those that are requested. By doing so, FOPA
burdens far more speech than is needed to further its substantial state
interest.
Finally, there is seemingly no reason why Florida could not enact
a regulation that would punish physicians after a case-by-case analysis
of whether the physician impermissibly plunged into a patient’s
private matters. Instead of targeting and banning one specific topic,
this regulatory scheme would allow consideration of additional
factors, for instance: whether other medical associations recommend
the questioning, the patient’s need for specific treatment, or the
previous relationship between the patient and physician. Although
the legality of most questioning under FOPA assumedly would not

333. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(4) (2014).
334. See id. (“A patient’s decision not to answer a question relating to the presence or
ownership of a firearm does not alter existing law regarding a physician’s authorization to
choose his or her patients.”).
335. See Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Cty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) (observing
that the county in that case “could, for example, target only offensive behavior or the manner of
delivery of speech without regard to viewpoint or subject matter,” rather than enacting an
unconstitutionally burdensome ordinance regulating protests in public places).
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338

change, the chilling effect on questioning would. Accordingly,
physicians would likely be more inclined to “express[] their views and
339
provid[e] information to patients” about any appropriate topic.
CONCLUSION
As Judge Wilson sensibly posited in Wollschlaeger v. Governor
of Florida, “doctors have a First Amendment right to convey [a]
340
message.” Although the police power of the states certainly permits
broad regulation of the medical field, this capability should not be
interpreted to authorize an override of the imperative protective
facilities provided by the First Amendment. Even when acting as
professionals, citizens retain their First Amendment rights. Thus, as
applied to physicians, courts and legislatures should not ignore Justice
Douglas’s reminder that “[t]he right of the doctor to advise his
patients according to his best lights seems so obviously within First
341
Amendment rights as to need no extended discussion.”
Framing First Amendment coverage of physician speech around
the government’s supposed interest in protecting patients’ privacy
rights erodes the foundation of trust upon which the physician–
patient relationship rests. Patients seek medical care because they
lack, and are thus seeking, knowledge that is critical to their health.
When states restrict specific physician speech, however, they mislead
patients’ decisionmaking process and lessen trust in the physician.
While states may assert that they are acting in the patients’ best
interest by ensuring proper care, this argument ignores the fact that
physicians are already obligated to act in their patients’ best interest.
Furthermore, when states prohibit physician speech, patients have no
sufficiently reliable alternative avenue by which to acquire that
information. Thus, physician speech should presumptively enjoy
coverage of the First Amendment’s protective shield so long as the

336. FOPA allows questioning when relevant. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (creating an
exception for relevant questioning). Under the proffered patient privacy regulation, anything
beyond the realm of relevancy would likely be considered an impermissible line of questioning.
337. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 906 (11th Cir. 2015) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting) (explaining FOPA’s chilling effect).
338. See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1367–68 (2005)
(arguing that any chilling effect is greatly weakened when the state does not target specific
speech).
339. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 902 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
340. Id.
341. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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speech at issue is (1) rendered in a trusting, physician–patient
relationship, and (2) the information given or requested is truthful
and nonmisleading.
But providing First Amendment coverage does not strip the state
of its regulatory powers. By contrast, the state can restrict physician
speech so long as the regulation passes constitutional muster. Given
the prominent similarities between commercial speech and physician
speech, the two should receive the same degree of First Amendment
protection—intermediate scrutiny. And FOPA meets its demise at
intermediate scrutiny. Restricting integral physician speech on one
specific topic imposes a mountainous barrier to medical care.
Furthermore, supplementary federal regulations achieve the same
interest allegedly furthered by FOPA—protecting patient privacy.
Consequently, FOPA fails to directly advance any substantial
government interest without burdening more speech than necessary.
Only time will tell how courts and state legislatures will react to
the Wollschlaeger decision. Assumedly, other states may believe that
they now have a “green light” to restrict physician speech through
FOPA-like statutory regimes. That decision, however, would be a
terrible mistake. It destroys the trust of the physician–patient
relationship and relegates it to obscurity.

